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We are very grateful for the six commentaries on Shuker and 
Kvarnemo (2021) and the breadth of  discussion they bring. 
Unfortunately, we cannot do justice to each piece and will instead 
focus on one over-arching aspect of  that discussion, the value of  a 
robust concept of  sexual selection. That said, we agree wholeheart-
edly with Andersson (2021) that the term “inter-sexual selection” 
should be retired.
Alonzo and Servedio (2021) emphasize the important distinc-
tion between conceptualizing and operationalizing sexual selec-
tion. As they note, our paper focuses on the former, but it does 
so because we feel that how to operationalize our definition is al-
ready well-embedded in behavioral ecology. Via measures of  se-
lection, in both the field and the laboratory, under both natural 
and experimental conditions, behavioral ecologists have long 
been adept at bringing the relevant statistical tools—including 
those highlighted by Shuster and Wade (2021)—to the study of  
traits thought to be under sexual selection. What we hope we 
have achieved here is to clarify the nature of  sexual selection as a 
fitness component. As such, we reaffirm the need for careful con-
ceptualization, alongside the clear desire for measuring sexual 
selection so strongly advocated by Shuster and Wade, because 
measurements and observations—the data empiricists all thrive 
on—are of  little value without interpretation. The science of  evo-
lutionary biology is in that interpretation. And as Simmons and 
Parker (2021) caution, interpretations can change, as new phe-
nomena are discovered.
However, in terms of  the broader point made by Alonzo and 
Servedio (see also Alonzo and Servedio 2019), we do not so much 
disagree as to there being gray areas in sexual selection, rather it 
is where those gray areas are. We continue to think that conceptu-
ally sexual selection does not have gray areas: that is why we wrote 
a one sentence definition of  it. However, operationally we fully 
concur that there are gray areas, more than fifty shades of  them 
perhaps. As we emphasized, it will be hard to identify and quan-
tify sexual selection on a trait in numerous real-life cases. Different 
fitness components may align. In her commentary, Kokko (2021) 
provides a characteristically clear-sighted discussion of  this point. 
But, we also feel that sexual selection should not be held to a higher 
standard. For instance, conceptually there is perhaps little fuss over 
viability selection (selection via survival) or fecundity selection (se-
lection via, well, fecundity). However, to operationalize those two 
components of  fitness empirically is also difficult in real life. That 
might mean that there are times when we put such delineation of  
fitness components to one side (see also Shuker 2010), but being 
aware that fitness can vary thanks to viability, fecundity, or compe-
tition for access to gametes, has conceptual value, and brings inter-
pretation to our data.
The empirical measurement of  sexual selection is the focus of  
Shuster and Wade’s commentary, work that remains at the heart 
of  our field. However, perhaps that focus has led those authors 
to consider our definition as overly narrow. In contrast, we agree 
wholeheartedly with Zuk (2021) in thinking that our definition 
is exceptionally broad. Deliberately, we do not tie sexual selec-
tion to any given mechanism (such as mate choice), nor to any 
sex or sex role, nor indeed to anisogamy or isogamy. We agree 
with Simmons and Parker (2021) that anisogamy—the genera-
tion of  two sexual functions—has had a remarkable impact on 
organismal evolution, as captured by the “sexual cascade” of  
Parker (2014; Parker and Pizzari 2015). But, the focus on gam-
etes—anisogamous or not—in fact allows the broadest range of  
mechanisms to impinge on sexual selection, from meiotic drive 
to mating displays. In that sense, we leave the operationalization 
of  sexual selection up to nature.
Finally, we also do not exclude indirect genetic effects (IGE) nor 
multi-level selection. After all, mate choice—while not originally 
conceptualized that way—is a quintessential IGE, with two classes 
of  social actors (males and females) and an interaction coefficient 
(ψ, or “mate preference” in more usual terminology). Beyond indi-
viduals, the fact that groups of  same-sex individuals may cooperate, 
and be more successful in gaining access to opposite-sex gametes 
than individuals acting on their own are, is also in no way excluded 
from our definition of  sexual selection (see also Shuker 2010). We 
might disagree as to whether such group courtship or coercion is a 
“group adaptation,” or instead a strategy by which individuals co-
operate with each other to maximize their inclusive fitness, but the 
mathematics end up the same.
In conclusion, we agree with many of  the comments that the 
future will no doubt bring many new empirical challenges for stu-
dents of  sexual selection, but we hope our definition provides a 
strong starting point for meeting those challenges.
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